Ferejohn, John and Forsyther, Robert and Noll, Roger G. (1980) Auctions. Engineering and Science, 43 (3). pp. 24-28. ISSN 0013-7812

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From scholarships to airport landing rights--auction mechanisms aid resource allocation decisions. Several Caltech social scientists are using auction mechanisms to design new methods of solving nonmarket decision-making problems, as well as those of traditional economic markets.

Item Type:Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:Economics
Record Number:CaltechES:43.3.auctions
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Item Category:All Records > Feature Articles
ID Code:3254
Deposited By: Jennifer Hawley
Deposited On:26 Dec 2012 05:24
Last Modified:04 Oct 2019 15:16

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