Ferejohn, John and Forsyther, Robert and Noll, Roger G. (1980) Auctions. Engineering and Science, 43 (3). pp. 24-28. ISSN 0013-7812 https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechES:43.3.auctions
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Abstract
From scholarships to airport landing rights--auction mechanisms aid resource allocation decisions. Several Caltech social scientists are using auction mechanisms to design new methods of solving nonmarket decision-making problems, as well as those of traditional economic markets.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | Economics |
| Record Number: | CaltechES:43.3.auctions |
| Persistent URL: | https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechES:43.3.auctions |
| Parent URL: | http://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechES:43.3.0 |
| Usage Policy: | You are granted permission for individual, educational, research and non-commercial reproduction, distribution, display and performance of this work in any format. |
| Item Category: | All Records > Feature Articles |
| ID Code: | 3254 |
| Deposited By: | INVALID USER |
| Deposited On: | 26 Dec 2012 05:24 |
| Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2019 15:16 |
